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SUMMA.RY
Economistshave been paying increasing attention to the study of
situations in which csumers face a discrete rather than a continous set
of choices. Such models are potentially very important in evaluating the
impactof government programs upon consi.mter welfare. Butvery little has
beensaid in generalregarding the tools ofapplied welfare economics in
discrete choice situations.
Thispaper shows how the conventional methods of applied welfare
economics can be modified to handle such cases. It focuses on the corn-
putationof the excess burden of taxation,and the evaluation of gua].ity
change.The results are applied to stochastic utility models, including
the popular cases of prohit and logit analysis. Throughout,the ernp)-asis
is on providing rigorous guidelines for carrying out applied work.
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Economists arepayingincreasing attention to the study of situations
in which consumers face a discrete rather thana continuousset of choices.
A considerable literature has growncoveringeconometric methodology and
applications toa wide variety of situations.' In a few specific cases,
estimates of discrete choice models have been employed for welfare analysis.2
Travel demand researchers have developed "composite cost" and "accessibility"
measures to evaluate the desirability of various states (Williams [1977),
Ben-Akiva and Lerman [1978)), but the relationship of these to conventional
welfare criteria has not been thoroughly explored. Indeed, very little has
been said in general regarding the validity of the tools of applied welfare
economics in discrete choice situations.
Nevertheless, in at least two areas in which discrete choice models are
applied, welfare judgments are of paranount interest.The first is the analysis
oftaxes and subsidies. Econometric studies of the impacts of taxes on labor
supply, savings, and housing decisions have permitted calculation of the welfare
cost or "excess burden" of the tax feature underconsideration.3 Traditionally,
such studies have assumed that the taxed activity will be pursued regardless
of the existence of the tax.
However, instances in which taxes influence discrete choices are numerous
arid important. For example, it has been suggested that the federal tax treat-
ment of owner—occupied housing not only increases the quantity demanded of owner-
occupied housing services, but also influences whether or not an individual owns
a home at all [Rosen, forthcoming]. For secondary earners, taxes affect not only
the number of hours of work, but also whether or not participation in the labor
1For examples and references, see McFadden [1976).
2For example, Domencich and McFadden [1975], Small [1976).
3See, for example, Barberger [1964], Boskin (1978], and Laidler (1969].—2—
market takes place jHec)ataxi,19743.Even for primary workers, taxes may
influence notonly the hours spent at a given occupation, but the choice be-
tweenoccupations as well.
A second important area is the analysis of quality changes in goods and
services. Nierous studies in such areas as transportation, education, health
care, child care, and pollution contain explicit or implicit welfare evalua-
tions of publicpolicies which change the quality of sane publicly or privately
supplied good. In manycases,the good affected is subject to discrete choice
modeoftransportation, public or private schools, typeof health care, typeof
childcare, and location of recreational activities all serve as examples.
The purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate that the conventional
methodsofapplied welfare economics can be generalized to handle cases in which
discretechoices areinvolved.We think it importantforseveral reasons
toset out the generalization carefully. First, there has been some suggestion
thatconventional welfare change computations may have no relevance in discrete
choice cases.4 Second, as the econometric estimation of discrete choice models
of many types gains in popularity, it is useful to have a clear statement re-
garding their use in applied welfare economics. Finally, the presence of dis-
crete choice introducessanedifferences in the relation between ordinary and
compensateddemand curveswhich alters the way in which empirical approximations
shouldbe carried out.
InSection II we review the computation of the Hicks iancompensated
variation for the "standard" case in which there areprice—inducedchanges in
quantity demanded by each individual. We also note its relation to the
4For example, Ben—Porath andBruno[1977] state that in Israel, the
pre—1975 taxstructurewas ..."lessa deterrent to work as such than an
inducement to searchfor untaxable typesof work" (our emphasis).They
suggest that "The concept of excess burden is not particularlywell defined
inthiscase ..."(p.289).—3—
Ha.rberger"excess burden" and to the Marshallian consumer's surplus. In
Section III it is shown how the canputations are performed for circumstances
in which discretechoice is involved, and Section IV extendsthe result to
qualitychanges. Section Vdiscussesin detail the application of the results
tostochastic utility models, including the cases of probit and logit analysis.
Throughout, the emphasisis onproviding rigorous guidelines for carryingout
appliedwork.
ii. Continuous Choice
In this section we review the justification for measuringprice—induced
utility changes as areas to the left of the appropriatecanpensated demand
curves. The basic analytical tool is the expenditurefunction, which is
treated concisely andelegantlyin Diamond andMcFadden[1974].
Supposethat a consumer has a twice differentiable, strictly quasi—
concave utility function u defined over the cornodities x and x, ,where
Xnistaken to be the numeraire. The two good case ischosen for convenience;
the results generalize easily to an arbitrary numberof commodities. The
consumer maximizes
u =u(x,x1)
(24)
subject to the budgetandnon—negativityconstraints
x +p1x1=y (2.2)
x. > 0 j =n,l (2.3)
where p1 is the price of good 1, and yis incorne—4—
Maximizationof (2.1) subject to(2.2)yieldsthe ordinarydemand
functions
x.=
x.(P1,Y) j= ri,l. (2.4)
We asse an interior solution
Cxi >0)with respect to both goods.
Substituting(2.4) into(2.1)wedefinethe consumer's indirect utility
function;
v(p1,y)UCX(p1,y),1(p1,y)) (2.5)
whichis knownto satisfy Roy's Identity:5
v/p1=Xl
.
(2.6)
Providedthat the direct utility function isstrictly increasing in x
and is non—decreasing inx1, v is monotonjc increasing in y and can
therefore be inverted to yield theexpenditure function -
y=
e(p1u).
(2.7)
The function e therefore indicates how iiuchincome is required to achieve
the utility level u when the price ofgood 1 is p1; it satisfies
UVC1,e(p1,u). (2.8)
Now suppose that the price of the first goodchanges fran p to
p .Bydefinition, the compensating variation associated withthe price
changeis
4e=e(p,u0)
-
eCp31°)
, (2.9)
5Roy's Identity followsfrom comparingthetotal differentials of (2.2) and (.2.5) andusing the first-ordermaximization conditions.—5—
This expression shows the amount of income the consumer must be given to make
him as well of at price p as at p .Mohring(1971] has forcefully argued,
that it is the appropriate measure for most problems of applied welfare
6 economics.
The problem now is to express (2.9) in terms of the compensated demand
function for x1,whichis defined by
x(p1,u)
=x1(p1,e(p1,u)).
(2.10)
This is done by applying Shephard's lemma:
e(p1,u)=x1(p1,u)
, (2.11)
p1
whereu is an arbitrarily selected utilitylevel.7 This equation gives the
compensating variation for an infinitesimal change in p1 ;tofind the compen-
sating variation for a finite change, (2.11) is integrated;
f
p1 fo 00Ic o
e(p1,u
)— e(p1,u) =j x1(p1,u)dp1 . (2.12)
0
p1
This gives the basic result mentioned at the start of this section; the
compensatingvariationof dpricechange is the area to the left of the Compen-
sateddemandcurve.
This result is easily aggregated.Define the aggregate compensated demand
functionfor good 1, ,asthe sum of the individual compensated demand
functions. X depends upon prices anduponthe utility levels of all consumers.
is employed, for example, by Hause (1975] and Diamond and McFadden
11974], both of which demonstrate that the compensating variation measure leads
tothe well—known Harberger formula for excess burden. Nevertheless, some Con-
troversy surroundsitsuse; see Chipman and Moore [l976a) andHause(1975].
7Shephard's lemmafollowsfrom differentiating (2.8) with respect to p1
andapplyingRoy's Identity.—6—
Similarly, define the aggregate expenditure function, E ,asthe sumofthe
ind.ividua2. expenditure functions at these same utility levels. Then by adding
the compensating variations (2.12) for all consumers, we obtain;
f
P1
=
J
x(p1,{u))dp1
, (2.13)
0
p1
where{u1} is the set of utility levels before the change.
For practical purposes, the area to the left of the compensated demand
curvein(2.13) is usually calculated from an econometric estimate of the
ordinaryorMa.rshallian demand curve.8 Although the compensated demand func-
tion for an individual can, under certain conditions, be computed exactly
frorn an econometric estimate of the Marshallian demand Iseade, 1978; Willig,
1976], the same is not trueofaggregates. This had led to an approximation
procedure, employed by a number of investigators such as Harberger L1964] and
peldstein 11978],in which the Slutsky equation is applied to the ordinary
aggregate demandcurveinorder to obtain estimates of compensated price
elasticities.This procedure is exact if (a) ax1/y is the same for every-
one, and (b) each individual! s share of aggregateincome is fixed regard-
less of price and income changes; in this case the Slutsky equation canbe
aggregated.To the extent that individuals' income slopes are similar, then,
thiswould appear to be a reasonable approximation procedure.
For the special case in which the price change is induced by atax (or
subsidy), (2.13) can be used to calculate the "excess burden"of the tax, i.e.,
the welfare loss brought about by distortions in relative prices.Following
81t has been shown that the area undertheordinary demand curveisitself an
exactmeasure of the utility change undervery restrictive conditions in the
demand function.See, for example, Chipxuan andNoore[1976b],Rader (l976b], or
Bruce[1977].—7—
Diamond andNcFadden11974], we define excess burden as
= — T
, (2.14)
where T denotes tax receipts. The exact form which equation (2.14) takes
inpractice depends on theincome effects generated by the uses of the taxrevenues
(or,alternatively, by a set of hypothetical lump-sum taxes of equal yield), and
thereforedependson the distribution of these revenue uses or taxes. Although
this point is well—known (see Friedman 11949], Bailey [1954], Harberger (1964),
and Hause 11975]), it is worth restating here because its implications for dis-
crete goods, discussed in the next section, are somewhat surprising.
Let c. and be the own-price slopes of the aggregate .Marshallian and
compensateddemandfunctions,respectively; and let cabe the income—slope of
the former, viewed as a function of aggregate income Y E Z y1 .Thenthe
Slutskyapproximation discussed above,
- -
(2.15)
canbe intuitively justified from the observation that X1dp1 is the income
compensation required to ameliorate the effect of a price increase dp1, and
hence uX1dp1 is the additional consumption induced if income is compensated.
A linear approximation to the compensated demand curve yie1d
tE =Xp1
+cLC(p1)2 (2.16)
0 1 2
X1tp1 + 1cx +X1c](tp1)
(2.17)
where X is the aggregate consumption at initial price p, and where
=pP1.Equation(2.17) can be viewed as the Taylor Series approximation to
tE, of second-order in p1—8—
Now consider two alternative assumptions about the uses of the tax revenues
T:(a)the partial equilibrium assumption that they areused in such a way as
togenerate no repercussions on demand for good 1 ,and(b) the general equili-
brium assumption that they are distributed uniformly in lump sum transfers. We
again compute approximations of second order in the price change. Under assuxnp-
tion (a)., tax revenues are computed along the Marshallian demand curve:
T 1X+ cttp1]Lp1. (2.18)
Under assumption (b), on the other hand, final demand contains an income
effect ,whereTG are thetaxrevenues,so that
TG=[X+ + , (2.19)
which can be solved for TG and expanded in a secona—order Taylor Series to yield;
TG
1xo1+(x+
X]•W)
(2. 20)
=+ c] (2.21)
But this is equivalent to computing taxes along the compensated demand curve.9
Subtractingtax revenuesfrom thecompensating variation in (2,16) and
rearranging yields the following alternative formulae for excess burden;
(a) Partial Eq.: 1 — 2ct)(tsp1)2 (2.22)
1 2 1- cx +Xw) (tsp1)
(2.23)
(b) General Eq.; )(G C1(tsp1).2
(2.24)
= 1— —
X1w) CAp1)2
• (2.25)
9SeeHause 119751, pp. 1156—1160, for a fuller discussion of the rationale
forusing the compensated demand curve in computing tax revenue under general
equilihrium assumptions. Note also that we are assuming a constant cost techno-
logy, i.e., introduction of the tax does not change the producer's price over
the relevant region. See also Rohif s' 11976] discussion of the adequacy of surplus
welfare measures under partial equilibrium assumptions.—'9-'
The general equilibrium version (2.24) is the famousexcess burden triangle
usually associated with Harberger.
Note that, whereas the compensating variation is of first order in
theexcess burden is itself of second-order in p1.Thus,the conditions
given by Willig 11976], under which the compensating variation isadequately
approximatedby theordinary consumer's surplus, do not necessarily justify
usingthe ordinary instead of the compensated dnand curve for excess buxden
calculations. Indeed, if the general equilibrium assumptionsunderlying
equation(2.24) prevail, then it is the best approximation Cup to second-
order terms in p1 )ofthe excess burden, and the fractional error from
C . C C C C usingc instead of in equation (2.24) is Cc—cz )/ct =X1w/ct
=— Orift
where 0 is the budget share of good 1, r is its income elasticity,and
isits compensated own—price elasticity.This error can be substantial for a
good, such as hou.sing, which absorbs a large portion of consumers' incomes.
For a normal good, the excess burden is positive and Issmallerin the
general than in the partial equilibrium context. This is because the consuirip-
tioncutback caused by the price distortion is lessened bythe incomeeffects
arisingfrom the uses of the taxrevenues.We will see in the next section
that sie oftheameleriorating income effect inthegeneral equilibrium case
islost in discrete good models, making the potential welfare losses from taxes
on such goodsgreater thanconventional analysis would imply.
III. DiscreteChoice
In thissection,we prove the basic theorem which establishes the validity
of using the area to the left of a compensated demandcurvefor a discrete
goodasa measure of the coxpensating variation. We take advantage of the— 10—
notationandgeneral plan of attack used inSection II for the continuouS goods
case.We then show how the use of empiricalapproximations for computingwel—
fare losses is modified.
Discretenessin demand can bemodelled in at least threeways.(a)
CoumoditieS may be available in continuous quantities,but in only one of a
nall number of mutually exclusivevarieties. An example is housing. It can
be purchased in either the rental or ownermode, but given the tenure choice,
a continuous quantity o housing
services can be consumed. Cb) Goods may be
available in discrete units which are so largethat most consumers choose
only one or two units. Examplesincludecollege degrees, transportation mode
for work trips, andmany consumerdurables.(c) Goodsmaybe purchased in
discreteunitsbecause nonconcaVitieS in utilityfunctions lead the consumer
to choose among alternative cornersolutions.For example,two television
showsaired simultafleOUlY canbeconsumed in any fractions, but most viewers
willprefertoconsume all of one and noneof the other •Notethat many
examples could be modelled equallywell as cases (a) or Cc).
In addition, even with concave utilityfunctions, particularprices and
incies'.maYlead to corner solutions at which a goodis not consumedatall.
EmpiricallY, this has led toecOnometric techniques such as Tobit analysis.
Although this is not usuallyconsidered discrete choice, we mentionit here
because the issues involved arefoally yery similarto those of the other
cases.
The xoble'n raised bi'allthese cases for the theoreticalderivation of
theCoipensatin9 yariatiOn is thatdiscreteness introduces a point ofdis-
continuityinto the demand functions, and/or a pointof non,differentiabi].1tY
intothe indirect utilityand expenditure functionS. Thus,the derivative in
equation C2.ll) may be undefinedat some "crossover" price.The keyto the11 —
resultinthissection is thatit isstill possible to integrate over (2.11),
sincethe expenditure function is continuous and has right and left—derivatives
at the point in question.
The formal models for the various cases differ in detail, but the proofs
for all are essentially similar. We therefore proceed by considering case (a)
in a three-goodmodel in which twoof the goods are mutually exclusive. The
proofs for the other cases and extensions to more than three goods are outlined
inAppendix A.
Consider,then,a consner with utility ftnction
u=u(.x ,x,x) (3.1) n12
where is the numeraire good. In order for the possibility of zero con—
sumption of good 1 or 2 to make sense, we assine that utility is finite
when either x1orx2iszero. As in the standardcase,utility is utaxi—
mized subject to
x+p1x1+p2x2=y (3.2)
> 0 j= 1,2, n (3.3)
To prevent both x1and fr being consumed in positive amounts; we
impose the constraint
0 (34)
10
As in the reyious section, we assume interior solutions rather thandeal
exp1icitlwith. non-negativity constraints; thus the numeraire and either
are consaed in positive quantitiàs,
.L0
Cornersolutions canalsobe dealt with using the framework developed
in this section. See Appendix A for a demonstration.12 -
Theore1.
Suppose a consumer inaxidzes,subjectto constraints (3.2) through (3.4),
a twice differentiable, strictly quasi—concave utility function of the
form (3.11. Assume 11isfinite whenever x1orx2 is zero, is strictly
increasing in x, and is non—decreasing in x andx2. Lete(p1,p2,u)
hetheminnumexpenditure eguired to achieve utility u, and let
U0 =v(,p2,y)be the value of the indirect utilityfunctionUat initial
prices and income. Then the compensating yariation for a changein price p1
0 f from p3 to p is;
e,p2,u°
—e,p2,°1
=JirP2u°)dPi
(3.5)
where x(.1 isthe compensated demand functionforgood1defined by
11p2,u) =x11,p2,e(1,p2,u°))
. (36)
Proof.Constraint (3.4) requires thatconsumptionof either good 1 or
good2be zero. If =0,theoptimalwtountof is foundbymaximiz—
ing U(X,X1,Olsubject to x3+ 1x1= y.Thefunction u is well-behaved
whenyiewed as afunctiononly of xand ,sothis suh-robl isformal—
lyidentical to theproblem oftheprevious section,andleads to well-defined
continuously differentiable indirect utility, expenditure,and compensateddemand
functions,each conditional on =0.Denotingthese by 1(1,y), 1(p11u)
andi(p1,u)
respectively, we knowfrom (2.11)that
= . (3.7)
11S0 long as the riumeraire is perfectly divisible, the assumption that u
isstrictly increasing in xandnon'-decreasin9in x1andx2guarantees
that the indirect ut1ity function exists andisstrictly increasifl9 in y,
andtherefoxecanbeinverted to find the expenditurefunction,13 -
Similarly,if x1 =0,the prob1n of maximizing u(x,O,x2)
yields functions2(p2,y), 2Cp21u)and i(p2,u) with the property
that
32/3p2=. (3.8)
For any incane y ,thechoice between good 1 and good 2 will, be
made by cparing (p1,)withV2 (p2 ,y) .Letk (p1 ,p2 ,y) index the
larger of the two, with k =1in case of a tie. Then the utility achieved
is
max{1(p1,) ,;2(p2,y))
. (3.9)
Thequantity y is therefore the incne requiredto achieve utility u
bothunconditionally and conditionallyon choice k
y=e(p1,p,) =e(p?u). - (3.10)
Lettingjindexeither good Cj= 1,2),thefact that (p.,y) <u
implies
>y 5= 1,2 (3.11)
since is strictly increasing in y ,and issimply its inverse
But (3.10) arid(3.11)together imply that
e(p1,p21u) =mm.(p.,u) . (3.12)
Since each of the functions is continuously differentiable in price,
so is e ,exceptat those prices for which e1 =e2;and at these points,— 14—.
eis continuous and right— aridleft—differentiable?2 Its price derivatives
are therefore bounded and piecewise continuous, and henceintegrable!13
Furthermore,
I1/p1 if k =1
= (3.13)
0 if k 11
provided the upper and lower expressions are interpreted as the left— and
right—derivatives,respectively, at the point of indifference between the
two goods.
12
Forgiven p2 and u ,let
valueof p1 (if any) at which the
=2(p2,u)
=e(p,p2,u)
e = forp1 > p ,good2 is
continuousat p ,since =
withrespect to p1 ,evaluatedat
e(p1,p2,u) —e(pt,p2,u)
rr]. 1
=
(.aa1/ap1)1
since is differentiable. Similarly, the right—derivative existsandis
equal to
1Seeany calculus text, e,g, Thomas 11960), p.214
y* =e2(p2,u).Letp be the single
constunerswitches goods. Thus,
For p1 <p
,good1is chosen and
chosenande = .Clearlye is
there. The left—derivative of e
is
urn
pl'P]
= liin 1(p1,u) —
pi—p- 15—
Itremains only to identify the right'-hand-side of (3.13) as the
compensated demand function, x(p1,p2,u) .Whengood 1 is chosen (given
, =;whengood2is chosen, x= 0.Thus,for an infin-
itesmalchange in p1 ,thecompensating variation (3.13) reduces to
e(p1,p29u)/ap1
=c(p1,p2,u)
. (.3.14)
Evaluating (3.14)at utility u0 max{v1 (p,y) ,v2 (p2 ,y) }andintegrating
over p1 yields (.3.5).
Q.E.D.
A more heuristic discussion of the theorem may be useful at this point.
Suppose an infinitesimal change, dp1 ,occursinthe price of good 1. If
a positive amount x1ofgood 1 is being consumedr then the welfare loss is
x1dp1 .Ifgood 1 is not being consied, i.e. =0,thenthe welfare
loss is again x1dp1 ,whichin this case equals zero, If the consumer is
just at the point of indifferencebetweengoods 1 and 2, no welfare loss
arises from switching from one good to the other. Therefore, integrating
over this point of discontinuity adds nothing to the total for a finite change.
In every case, then, the welfare loss fran an incremental price change is des—
cribed by the incremental area to the left of the demand curve.Ifincome is
compensatedas the price changes, this is equivalent to measuring the area to
theleftof the compensated demandcurve.This intuitive discussion applies
equally well to cases Cb) andCc),mentioned earlier,14 and to corner solutions.
14.aler11974,pp. 131—136) demonstrates an even stronger result for case
(h),in which the good in questionmust be purchased ina given quantity ornot
atall. Re shows that, for a fall in the price of such a. good, the compensat-
ing variation is given bythearea to theleft of its ordinary demand curve.
Thisfollows from our result because income eftects axe absent, and thus the
ordinary andcompensateddemandcurvesare identical. So long as the price re-
mains abovethe "criticalprice0 p at which the consmmer purchases the dis--
crete 9ood,no compensation is required to keep him at the initialutility level;
andbelow the critical price, the compensation cannot affect the amount ofthe
discretegood purchased. However, R. Willig has pointed out to us thatNler is
incorrect in sthting that the result also holds when the individual is consuming
the good, and the price rises abo're p .Thisasymmetry occurs because for the
price rise, the compensating income alters the itica1 price itself, and hence the
ordinary demand curve and the relevant compens. d demana curve axe not identical.— 16—
Asin the ordinary goods case, we define an aggregate compensated
demand function for good 1, X ,asthe sum of the individual cpensated
demand functions. It depends upon the prices and the utilities of all con-
sumers. Similarly, define the aggregate expenditure function E as the
sum of the individual expenditure functions at arbitrarily selected utility
levels.Then, by adding over consumers, we obtain the result that the sum
ofthe individual coIn psating variations is given by- the area to the left
of the aggregate cnpensated demand curve:
£
p1
-
= JxiiP2i{u})aPi
(3.15)
where u1 is the initial utility level of the ith consumer.
Applying the Theorem
For purposes of applying Theorem 1, it is important to notice that the
demand curvein(3.15) is the -unconditional demand for good 1, and is not
conditional on the choice of good 1. Both the discrete choice itself and
the quantity demanded conditionalon that choice are incorporatedin
To make this distinction clear, write the compensated demand fuhction
in equation (3.5), for !ndividual i ,as
ci io ci io —ci io
x1(p1,p21u
)= 6 (p1,p2,u)x1 (p1,p2,u
) (3.16)
where is a compensated discrete choice index, i.e., is 1 if good
1 is chosen and 0 otherwise, assuming that price changes are compensated in
order to permit achievement of initial utility level .Thecompensated
demandconditionalon choice of good 1,X1,isdefined as in the above proof. Adding— 17—
theright—hand sides of equation (.3.16) for the N individuals in the economy
yields an alternative version of (3.15):
f
NCl 10 -'C1 3.0 1E E 6i (p1,p2,u )x1 (p1,p2,u )dp1
. (3.17)
1=1
0
p2.
There are two important problems which must be solved in order to make
equation (3.17) useful for applied work. First, aninvestigator cannot Jaow
withcertainty whether or not a representative individual will consume a given
discrete good: All that can be assigned is the probability ir that the good
will be purchased, conditional upon a setofmeasurable characteristics (race,
sex, etc.) as well as prices and income. Anattractive way to model this is to
assumethat each individual's utility function is deterministic (as in the pre-
ceding section), but that because of factors unobservable o the investigator,
theoutcome appears random.15Thusas we move to applications of our theorem
and attach probabilistic interpretations to variables that were heretofore
deterministic,we are not moving to a different framework, but aredealing with
aspecial case of the model developedabove. Replacing tne criolce lnue
in (3.17) with this choice probability converts (3.17) to an equation for
15This seems tohave acquired the name "random utility"approach, in
contrast to the "constant utility" approach, in which the utility function
itse.lf(or equivalently, the choice tnechanisin)is viewed as having a random
component.Operationally, these two formulations are equivalent, i.e.
leadto the same kind of estimatingequations. Their interpretationsare
discussed at length by Williams (1977].— 18—
thexpected welfare change.16
The second problem is that is a compensated diScrete choice index;
therefore, it should be replaced with a compensatedchoice probability. We
orovide in the next sub—section an approximation procedure, analogousto that
or continuous9oods,for doing this.
Ourmethod is therefore fullyoperationalprovided we can find econo—
ietrictechniques for estimating the required demand curves. A straightfoiward
zrocedu.re would be to estimate the discrete choice arid conditional demand
£.-:tionsjointly using maximumlikelihoodtechniques. Alternatively, a
:cristent recursive procedure has been developed by Heckman [1977].
S1tskyEffect
Asatisfactory approximation procedure for converting econometric
estinatesinto compensated demand relations must take into account the fact
that neither the Slutsky equation nor the computation of tax revenues is the
16Notethat oniy ifthe choice probability is independent of price
p1will the correct answer be obtained by calculating areas for conditional
dema.dcurves andmultiplying them by the probabilities. Thus, for example,
Feldsteiri and Friedman [1977] are correct in using the latter procedure
to calculate welfare effects of changes in the price of health insurance,
because in their model theprobability of illness is assumed to be exogenous.
wever, one must not be irilsied into thinking their procedure is generaliz-
abletoeridogenous probabilities.— 19—
samefor discrete as for continuous goods, because the nature of the income
effects is fundamentally changed. In the continuous case, it is at least
reasonable to suppose that all consumers have identical income slopes for
good 1; this permits the Slutsky equation to be aggregated, and makes plausible
the general equilibrium assumption that tax revenues are redistributed so
as to return all consumers to their initial utility levels. In the discrete
case,however, we explicitly recognize a group whose consumption of good 1 is
zerothroughout a range of incomes, andthus the analysis must be modified.
In order to focus on the issue of discreteness 2Se,it is useful to
abstract from other differences among individuals by assuming N consumers
who differ only in their preferences between goods ].and2) Thus, they
have identical incomes y ,andidentical conditional Marshallian and compen-
sated demand functions 1(p1,y) and (p11u) ,respectively.This is, of
course, a very restrictive case. However, it is useful in that it highlights
the important differences that appear when discreteness is explicitly taken
into account. If the assumptions of this section seem too restrictive for a
given problem, they can be relaxed, although the results will be less intuitive
and computationally more complicated.
17Assume, for example, that utility for the ith individual is given
by U1(XX1X2) =f(x1X1rX2)+ + where S.= 1ifx
is
chosen and =0otherwise (= 1,2),and where and are constants.— 20—
TheSlutskyequation for this modelis
aai ai] -. = +X15j (3.18)
Nowlet7r1(p1,p2,{y'}) be the fraction choosing good 1 at the given prices
andincomes. Inanalogy to the compensated demandfunction, define the com-
pensated choice probability
7r(p1,p2,{u'})1(p11p2,e1(p11p2,u1)}) (3.19)
whereu1 ande1 represent theutilitylevel and the expenditure function,
respectively,for constmer i
Define the aggregate quantities:
X1•
=
N1T1X1 (3.20)
=x°=NTr (3.21)
Y =Ey=Ny. (3.22)
3.
Note that since all incomes y1 are assumed equal, X1 and 711 depend on
themonly through aggregate income Y. Hence we may write;
111
=¶1(p1,p2,Y)
(3.23)
X1= X1(p1,p2,Y)=N1T1(p1,p2,Y)i1(p1,p2Y/N)
- (3.24)
Differentiating(3.19) at aninitialpoint for which = and
= ,andapplyingour previous result (3.14), yields the choice-.
probability analogue to the Slutsky equation:— 21—
7F1 7r1i
air1 air1 =
•5— + .X1-. (3.25) 1
-
Equations(.3.18) through (3.25) taken together yielda Slutsky-like equation
or the aggregate demand unctiois;
axax1 x1.ax1 xl = ÷-l- - C1'-ir1) -. . (3.26)
In the special case arr1/ay=0,equation(3.26) is the usualaggregate
Slutsky equation, except the inccne effect is divided byir1 and is thus
larger than in the continuous case. The intuition behind this follows from the
conceptual experiment implicit in the compensating variation measure. Were it
required to maintainutilityafter a price rise dp1,itwouldbe necessary
to royidecorapensation equal to X1dp1 to that fractionrr1 of the population
which. consi.uesgood 1. But this wouldhave the.same effect onconsumption &s
raisingall inces equally, by an aggregate amount(X1/Tr1)dp1, sincethe
extrapayments to non-consi.ners would have no impact (so long as -
aTr1/ay
=0)
onaggregate consumption X1 .Thus,the compensation would cause consumption
of good 1 to rise by (aX1/3Y) (X1/1r1)dp1,whichgives the first income—effect
term in (3.26). The last term arises from the effects of income compensation
on the choice probability itself.
Excess Burden
Following the procedure of Section II, we approximate the demandcurves
bystraight lines with slopes:
ax1/ap1
=cx
C C
ax1/ap1
=cx
ax1,'ay =— 22—
Wealso let
air1/aY =
Asbefore, the compensating variation is given by equation (2.16); note,
however, that this is no longer equivalent to (2.17).
We next proceedto calculate taxrevenues under (a) partial and (b)
generalequilibrium assumptions, makinguseof the "Slutsky-like" equation
(3.26),which can be written:
=cz+(X1/ir1)w
—
(l—7r)(X1/1T1)2v (3.27)
(a) For the partial equilibrium case, taxrevenueis simplygivenby
(2.18), and excess bu.rden by (2.22). Substituting (3.27) into (2.22)
yields:
x= 4r-.c+
2(X1/1T1)W
—2(1—
7r1)(X1/7r1)2\] (p1)2 (3.28)
= + (X1/711)W — (1—(X1/i12v](p1)2 (3.29)
Note that, in the absence of income effects on the choice probability
('= 0),theexcess burden (3.29) is larger than wouldbe calculated
from(2.23), if discreteness were ignored.
(b)If tax revenues are returned uniformly in lump sum transfers,
equation (2.20) remains valid, but is no longer equivalent to (2.21),
correspondingto the fact that the compensation nolonger returns each
consumer,even approximately, to his initial utility level. Under this
regime, the fraction who paid the tax have their real incomes reduced,
while the others have them raised. In neither group are individuals moving— 23—
alongtheir compensated demand curves. Subtracting (2.20) from(2.16) and
applying (3.27) gives the excess burden:
G ic 2
x - 2c&—2X1](p1)
1(C + 2(2-
1)X1
2(1 -7r)&-)2v3
:1)2
(3.30)
= +
(i—— 2)X1w
—Ci. — 7r1)(—)v) (p1) . (3.31)
Comparing (3.31) with (2.25), we see again that, in the absence of income
effects on the choice probability, the excess burden is larger than that
computed by ignoring discreteness, though it is still smaller than in the
partial—equilibritr case (3.29).
So in general, if the choice probability is independent of income but the
conditional demands have positive income elasticities, the usualapproximation
procedure which ignores discreteness underestimates the compensating variation
andthe excess burden of a price rise. There are two reinforcing tendencies
causing the result. First, the usual Slutsky correction results in an over-
estimate of themagnitudeof the compensated price elasticity, and hence an
underestimate of the compensating variation. Second, theamelioratingeffects
of tax—revenue redistribution on misallocation are less, because some of the
distributions are "wasted" on non—consumers of the good in question. Wesus-
pectthat this result is a specialcase of a more genera]. proposition that
standardprocedures tend to underestimate excess burden(i.e.,the compensat-
ingvariationless taxrevenues) for groups of non—identical consumers.
Weconclude this section by compiling, in Table 3.1, the results for
computing excess burdens. The fouulae have been converted to elasticity
form, using the definitions— 24 —
p1Bx1—
x1 ap1
ax1
_air
3y
x1p1 0=
ir=
Theexpressions given are those which should replace ( in the Harberger
formula,
=4x1p1r-ñ(p/p)2
derived frt (2.24).
TABLE 3.1
Factors for Computing Excess Burdens
Continuous Discrete
partial equilibrium
Generalequilibrium
— £+en
—C — On
— C+— (— l)0
—C+ —2)Ofl -( — 1)O
Observe that when ir =1,theexpressions in the second column equal
theircounteziarts in the first. In both relative andabsoluteterms, the
error introduced by ignoring discreteness is small when practically
everybody consumes the good. When ir tends toward zero, on the other hand,
termsinvolving 0 also tend toward zero, whereas those involving 0/it
tend to
18Thus, the error induced by ignoring discreteness,
18
Nirp11 0/it =
Ny)/ir =x1p1/y— 25—
i.e.,the difference between terms in Table 3.1 multiplied by
tends to zero absolutely (though not as a proportion of excess burden) as ir
approaches zero.
Afinal issue concerns the conceptual experiment which lies behindthe
resultslistedin the table. It is implicitly assumed that tax revenues are
returnedto the population at large. To the extent that it is possible to
target the revenuesonly to the consumers of the taxeddiscretegood, the
usual formulae would apply without modification. If some targeting occurs
but it is incomplete, the excess burden wonirl be somewhere between the "continuous"
and "discrete" calculations.
IV.Quality Changes
Thus far, ourfocus has been themeasurement ofprice—induced welfare
changes. Hever, in many discrete choice problems the evaluation of quality
changes is of primaryinterest.For example, we may wish to evaluate changes
infrequencyofbus servicesincontextswhere consumers havea choicebetween
bus andauto; or changes in noise levels when individuals have the options of
stayingin the affected locale or of moving.
Onepossibilityfor dealing with a ality change is to convert it to an
equivalent price andthento apply the technique discussed in Section
III. Unfortunately, this is possible only in the very special case in wIich all
consumers have constant and identical marginal rates of substitution between
the relevant quality variable and the numeraie •Forexample, thIs assumption
is often made in transportation studies, by assuming a single constant value of
time for everyone. Demand for a particular transportation service canthenbe— 26—
viewedas a function of money plus time price, and consumer surplus techniques
are applicable. However, this example illustrates the tenuousness of such an
assumption,since both theoretical andempirical considerations suggest that
valueof time depends upon a variety of factors such as the wage rate.
An alternative tack is to extend the approach taken in Section III, by
adding a quality variable to the model. Suppose that good ].inthe modelof
the previous section has associated with ita quality variable described by
the scalar q1 ,whichis considered exogenousby consumers. (The variable
could also be interpreted as the level of provision of a public good which
is complementary to good1.)Thus:
u =u(x,x1,x2,q1) (4.1)
where, as before, u is assumed to be finite when either x1 =0or x2 =0
We assume further that quality of good 1 does not matter unless good 1 is
being consumed:
=0. (2)
As in Section III, the indirect utility function and the expenditure
functionare well—defined,continuous, right— and left-differentiablein all
arguments,and satisfy
u=v(p1,p21g1,e(p1,p2,q1,U))
. (4,3)
Twoalternativeformulations of the problem areobtainedby implicitly differ-
entiating (4.3 with respect to q1 or p1 ,respectively,keeping in mind
thatthe right— andleft—derivativesmay differ at the crossover points.
Takingthequality-derivatiVe of (4.3) yields
=— (l/XYav/q1, (4.4)— 27—
whereXE v/3y isthe marginal utility of income.Thisintuitive
formula simply states that the marginal willingness-to-pay for a quality change
is given by the marginal utility of quality, converted to monetary units via
the marginal utility of income. For problems in which the indirect utility
function isexplicitlyspecified, as in Section V below,equation(4.4) is
extremelyuseful, particularly if itis reasonable to approximate A (an
empiricalquantity, given the normalization implicit in the econometric pro-
cedure) by a constant. However, the constancy of is in no sensenecessary
for (4.4) to be valid.
Taking the price—derivative of (.4.3) on the other hand, and applying Roy' S
identity,yields Shephard' s lemma,whichwas the starting point for deriving
Theorem1of Section ITI.Thus, by simply adding q1 to the list of arguments
of all the functions, Theorem 1 is seen to remain valid in the present context.
This fact enables us to evaluate quality changesin terms of changes
in consumer's surplus, along the lines explored by BradfordandHildebrandt
(1977] and Willig 11978) for continuous goods.
To see this, assume, following Bradford and Hildebrandt, that when
the price of good 1 becomes high enough, the consumer does not care about
its quality, presumably because none of the good is being consumed. More
prec.sely, we assume that the quality derivative of the expenditure function
becomes arbitrarily small as the price of good ].rises:
lim9e(p,p2,q1,u0)/3q1
=0. (4.5)
pl-,.
Thus differentiating our previous result, (3.5), with respect to and
letting p +yieldsthe following result:
Theorem 2.
Lettheutility function (4.1) satisfy (4.2) and all the assumptions of— 28—
Theorem1. Let e (p1,p21q11u), the mini.mi expenditure required toachieve
utility usubject to constraints (3.2) -(3.4),satisfy (4.5). Then
a
.— e(p1,p2,g1,u
) ——j x1(p11p2,q1,u)dp1 , (4.6)
1 lo
p1
where the derivatives are to be interpreted as left- and right—derivativesat
points ofnon—differentiability.
Notethat 14.6) is the change inthe area to the left of the ccpensated
demand curve as it shifts in response to the change in •Thisis the result
derivedfor the case of continuous goods by Bradford arid Hildebrandt 11977],
using a slightly different assumption on ' Thus,we have demonstrated that
the Bradfoxdildebrandt formula remains valid in the discrete goods case.
Equation14.6) is easIly integrated to obtainthe compensating variation
for a quality changefrom to
,p2,u°fld1 . (4.7)
purtheordirectaggregation of (4.7) is possible to obtain aformula in
terms of the aggregate compensated demandfunction;
= x1,p2,q{u'1)dp1
C48)
V.pp1Icatiofl to Econometric models
jcadden J1973, 19763 has shown that abroad class of discxete choice
odels can be deriyed by assuming that eachconsumer maximizes a utility
function with a stochastic term accounting for differences in tastes that
are wkobseryableto the investigator! Since such modelsunderlie the bulk of— 29—
currentempiricalworkon discrete choice, it is useful to examine the form
which the results of the previous twosectionstakewhenapplied to stochastic
utilitymodels, in particularto the popular probit andlogit models. As
noted above, these stochastic utility models can be viewed as specialcases
of the basic deterministic model discussed in Section III.
In our notation, the assumption behind al]. these models is that the
conditional indirect utility function ofconsumeriforgoodj ,
isadditively separable into three components as follows;19
iii iii v,,y)=V(y ) +W (p. ,q,y;S ) +C. (5.1)
whereW() is a "universal" or "strict utility" function whose form is
identical for all consumers; andwhereEisthe realization for consumer
3
iof a random variable which is independent of the arguments of
W
The vector contains observable characteristics of the consumer, and
attributes of the discrete goods (e.g., locational attributes) which may
varyacross consumers.
Byassuming a jointprobability distribution on{c.) we obtain the
probability, conditional on prices, quality levels, andobservableconsumer
characteristics, that utility ismaximized by choostng good 1;
=Probjc. <—
W
for all j] (5.2)
where W denotes the second texin (.5.1). Given specific forms for the
19Thefirst term in C5.l) does not enter the econometric specification
of the discrete choice model, since it is independent of jit has usually
been ignored in the literature. The remaining terms have generally been des-
cribed as the "utility function" though it is clear from the inclusion of
price as an argument that they are part of an indirect utility function. A
true indirect utility function would have all prices as arguments and would
not depend on j ; hence the qualification 'conditiona1." See Small [1977)
for a fuller discussion of this point.— 30—
functionsW. ,theirparameters (up to a normalization convention) can be
estimated from a sample of observed choices by maximizing the likelihood
function associated with (5.2).
In order to forecast the aggregate demands, we need to measure the in-
comes y and other characteristics S1 of the individuals in the population
under consideration. One way to do this is to sample the population, and
assume that each sample member i is representative of a group of N1 indivi-
duals who are identical with respect to their incomes and measured characteristics.
The probability calculated from (5.2) can therefore be interpreted as a
prediction of the fraction of this particular class of consumers who will choose
good 1; to compute expected aggregate demand from the class, we multiply by the
conditional demandfunction,as in (3.20):
X1(p11p2,q1,y1;S1) =N
.
Furthermore,applying Roy' sIdentityfor the conditional demand function
in(5.3) yieldsan expression in terms of the marginal utility of income,
x(p11p2,q1,y1;S1)=—(N'/2)TW/3p1 . (5.4)
In the following discussion, we suppress the superscript i and the explicit
1.
dependenceon S ,whichis assumed to be fixed.
Having specifiedfunctional forms for the components W of the indirect
utility function, and having implicitly normalized by choosing a specific joint
probability distribution function for the stochastic term c. ,weare free to
make assumptions about W. on the basis of purely empirical considerations. We
now make three such assumptions, which are likely to be valid in many applications: a)
that the marginal utility of income, X ,isapproximately independent of the
price and quality of good 1; (b) that the discrete goods are sufficiently unimportant
to the consumer so that income effects from quality changes are negligible, i.e.
that the compensated demand function in (4.6) is adequately approximated by the
Marshalliari demand function; and (C)thatW1/aq1 0 as p1 +,aslightly
stronger version of (4.5). -Equation (4.6) can therefore be aggregated over members— 31—
ofthis consumer group to yield:
1 aE ____________ =
j1pi,p2,q1,y) a1
p1
But(5.2) implies that ir depends on its arguments only through the functions
W1andW2. Wemay therefore make a change of variable, =
W1(p1 ,q ,y)
to write:
13E 1
=— (1/X)ir1(w,w2)a/aq1
0 0 where =
W1(p1,q11y), = W1(a,q11y).Usehas been made of a standard
theoremfor differentiating a definite integral with respect to its limits
(Thomasr1960], p.720), plus assumption Cc) above.Integrating over
q1
from initial to final values, therefore, we have:
(bE)/N =— (l/X) (5.5)
0 whereW1 =
Equation(5.5) is extremely useful for computing welfare effects using
discrete choice models estimated from micro data, since it avoids the explicit
use of the aggregate demandfunctions,which arenotnormally obtained in
closedformfrom such studies. In fact, though equation (5.5) is derivedabove
usingthe previous results onaggregate demandcurves, it can instead be derived
directly from the definition (4.3) of the expenditurefunction.
20Equation(5.5)is easily generalized to many simultaneous price and
quality changes, provided the Jacobian matrix (r/aW.)issyamnetric. In
that case. the following line integral is unique,i.e,path—.indepefldent (see
tSilberberg, 1972)):
W
=— (1/A)JEw.(w)dw.
(5.5a)
Jj ) — —)
Wo
where W is a vector
—ofcomponents W. ,andtakes initial and final values
0 —
and respectively.
1
w1(w1,W2)dW1— 32—
1Tosee this, recall that the previous results were based on Shepherd's.
lemma, obtained by differentiating (4.3) with respect to price. As mentioned
in Section IV, one may instead differentiate (4.3) with respect to quality,
leading to (4.4). The indirect utility v of (4.4) is equal to for
that fraction iT1 of the consmer group which chooses good 1, andisequal
to 2 for the rest. Since only depends on q1, aggregating (4.4) and
calculatingav1/3q1from .(5.l) yields:
aE/aq1
=N(rr1/X)3W1/q1. (5.6)
Equation(5.6) is perfectly general, but one must use caution in integrating
it, sincetheincome variable which appears as an argimient in all the functions
is compensated, i.e., is that value which maintains the original utility level.
With thea.ssmmptions of constant 7.and negligible income effects, however,
integrating(56) yields(5.5) directly.
Afinal point to notice about equation (5.5) is that jt applies equally
well to a price change, if andWare defined as the values taken by
W1 at the initialandfinalprices, respectively. This may be seen simply by
replacingq1 by p1 in the above paragraph. Alternatively,the price—change
version of (5.5) can be derived directly by integrating (5.4)
In the course of the econometric estimation of the choice model, specific
functional forms for the W'S are assumed, and estimatesof the coefficients
areobtained. Hence, one can compute W1 at the initial andfinalquality
levels, arid can therefore compute the integral in (5.5). Furthermore, if
price is included as a variable in the specification, one has anestimate of
Using this information along with the conditional demand rwhich
is often known, 2Lcanbe computed by using Roy's Identity.21 Equation (5.5)
4.1.
More specifically, suppose that ois the coefficient of the price
variable in a probit or logit regressior1 Then 2 =- o./, which, as noted
above is an empirical quantity given the normalizationmpIicit in econometric
procedure.33 —
thereforerepresents an operational procedure for calculating welfare effects.
We illustrate its use below for the binary probit and logit models.
Probit
Inthe binary probit model it is assumed that Cc1 - isa standard
normal yariate. The probabilities are therefore given by
=:1.
.1rl
where is the cumulative normal distribution function. Formula (5.5) for
thecompensating yariati becomes;
=— C1/2 w2)dW1
=— (1/?J) (5.7)
- -
wtere =
w—W2and
jf= — ..Givena probit estimation of thefunctions
W1 and W2
,thisquantity can be computed for any priceor quality change.
22The generalization to simultaneous changes intwo pxice andtwo quality
variablesis straightforward, since the Jacobian condition rr1fBW2=ir2/3W1is
satisfied. Equation (.5.5a) in footnote 20 thus becomes
fw
= - 4 J{(W1
-.w) dw1+11- (W1 W2) 3dW2}
= - 4IW2+
JC)dw)
(5.7a)
where W2 =W
Recalling that W. is an indirect utility function, thefirst term in (5.7a)
the negativeo the willingness to pay forauniform improvement in both goods umagnitudeW2, whereas the second term gives the appropriate consumer surplus
forany improvement in good 1relative to good 2.— 34—
Logit
The ].ogit model arises from the assumption that the stochastic utility
components are independently and identically distributed with the extreme
value ordouble-exponential distribution [McFadden, 1973, 1976]. This leads
to a formula for the probabilities:
exp(WL) =
2
9..= 1,2- (5.8)
Z exp(W.)
In this case, the integral in (5.5)canbe evaluated explicitly,leading to:
w (E)/N=— (l/A)[lnE exp(Wi] (5.9)
j J
Wi
where the square brackets indicate the difference in the expression inside
23
whenevaluated at the initial and final points.
VI. Conclusion
The analysis and estimation of discrete choice models is currently enjoy-
ing a popularity which is unlikely to abate in future years. Ultimately, both
researchersaridpolicy makers will be interested in ascertaining thewelfare
implications of these models. The purpose of this paper has been to set forth
rigorous procedures for doing so. It has been shown how, under quite general
conditions as well as for the special cases of probit and logit analysis, the
usual techniques for measuring welfare effects must be modified for discrete
choice problems. Particular attention has been focused on how the standard
corrections for income effects might be altered. The results apply to the study
of both price and quality chan9es
23Like the Probit model, the Logit modelsatisfiesthe Jacobian symnetry
conditions, and calculation of C5.5a) for many price and quality changes yields
equation (.5.9)alteredonly in thgt the liits for evaluating the term in the
square brackets are the values W andWtaken by the vector of all W at
initial and final points. The term in squarebracketshas been identified in
thetransportation literature as the "inclusive price" or "composite cost" of an
alternativecomposed of several sul,-alternatives IBefl'AkiVa, 1973; Willa.amS,1977].— 35—
APPENDIXA
A.l Proof of Theorem 1 for different types of discreteness.
1.The goodmaybe purchased only in discrete units which axeso
largethat most consumers choose only one or two units.
Theutilityfunction is uCxx1)wherex > o,andx cantake on
valuesof only unityorzero. Utility is maximized subject to the budget
constraint +x1p1
=y.Ifx =0,theoptimal amountofx is
trivially equal to y.This sub-problem yields the expenditure function
conditionalon x= Cu) .Similarly,ifx1 =1,the conditional
expenditure function 1Cp1,u) is found trivially. As in the case analyzed
in the text, the point of maximum utility is associated with the minimum of
thesetwo expenditure functions:
eCp1,)
=
Sincee arid e1 are both continuouslydifferentiable in price (with
0 so is e ,exceptat that price at which l = ,andat
thispoint e is continuous andright— and left-differentiable. The rest
oftheargument follows directly that used in the text.
2. Particular prices and inctesleadto corner solutions at which a
ciood is notconsumed at all.
Sincewecannot now assume an interior solution, the expenditure
function conditional on x1 >0may not be well defined. However, itis
not difficult to see that continuity and nonsatiability of u guarantees
that the expenditure function for the overall problem, e(p1,u) ,is
continuous everywhere and is difterentiable within each of the two regimes
=0and x1 >0.Henceis it right- and left—differentiable at every
point, and the argument in the text applies.—36—
3.Goods maybepurchased in discrete units because nonconcayities
in utility functions lead the consumer to choose among alternative corner
solutions.
For cases in which discreteness arises frr noncoricavity of the utility
function, no general theory isavailablefor use in deriving properties of
theresulting demand functions.. Indeed, so far as we know, no attempt has
yetbeen made toderive formally statistical discrete choice models forsuch
cases,andtodo so would be beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless,
it is not difficult to see thatwell-beha'redexamples can be treated within
the framework presented in the text. Suppose, for example, that in a three-
good world, all the indifference curves between x1 and x2 are concaveto
the origin, but indifference curves between either x1 or x2 and the
numeraire areconvex.Then at every price vector, consumption of either x1 or
will be zero; hence the constraint x1x2 =0can be added without changing
the problem. Furthermore, the assumptions guarantee that u(x0x2) and
u(x,x110), viewed as functions of two variables, arewell—behaved. Thus the
proof of Section III applies.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1 for arbitrary numbers of gocds.
1. More than one continuous good.
The interpretation of as a vector of goods presents no problems
provided that the discussion of the "standar case in Section II generalizes.
That this is true is shown in Varian 11978, pp. 209—211).
2. More than two discrete goods ,allmutually exclusive.
Utility is 9iven by u =uCx,x1,x2...,x,) where x > 0 Cj= n(l,...2)
andwheze'0O =1,...Z) impliesthat x =0for r k •The
r
budgetconstraint is x + E kk =yIf x >0,thenutility is found
k=1
k— 37—
bymaximizingu(x,O,...xk,...,O) subjectto x+ = y.Thefunction
u is well—behaved when viewed as a function onlyofxandXk,andits
maximization leads to a (conditiDnal) continuously differentiable expenditure
function ek(pk,u) .Theonly difference between this case and that discussed
in the text is that there are now 2..suchsub-problems, rather than two. But
te idea is the same; utility maximization leads to the expenditure function
=minjpk,u).Sinceeach of the is continuously differ-
k
entiable in price,so is e except at those prices at which = ,andat
such cross—over points e is continuous and right— and left—differentiable.
The rest of the argument follows directly from the proof of Theorem 1.
3.More than oneset of mutually exclusive discrete goods.
Utilityis given by u(xfl,xll,x12,x21,x22,...xLl,x22), where all the
arguments in the utility function are non—negative. The constraints are
xklx 2 =0for
all k 1,LThe budget constraint is x +kl
+pk2xk2)=y.Inthis
case, we can imagine the individual solving2' sub—problems of the sort dis-
cussed in Theorem 1.Eachsub—problem arises from maximizingutilitywith one
argument in each of the pairs equal to zero. This leads to well—behaved
conditional expenditure functions, the minimumofwhich is associated with the
consumer's optimum. At each vector of "cross-over" prices, the minimum of
these functions is continuous andright-and left—differentiable in each price.
The rest of the argument follows as in the text.
APPENDIX B
In this Appendix we apply the results of Table 3.1 to the problem of
estimating the excess burden of the implicit subsidy for owner—occupied housing
inthe U.S. personal income tax. Our purpose is not to arrive at a definitive— 38—
estimateof the efficiency loss associated with the provision.Such a
calculation would necessarily involve re cognition that the relevantincome
and price elasticities vary across income classes, asdoes the size of the
implicit subsidy itself [Laidler, 1969]. Our goalis merely to take advantage
of some "stylized facts" concerning the demand forowner—occupied housing in
order to see how the excess burden varies underalternative assumptionS.
We begin by discussing briefly the relevanttax provisions. (For a more
complete exposition, the reader isreferred to Laidler [1969].) Under the U.S.
incometax, homeownersare not required to include imputedrent in adjusted
grossincome. Atthe same time, they are allowed to deduct paymentsfor
property taxes and mortgage interest.Denote by d the proportion of housing
costs that are excluded from the tax base.Then assuming a horizontal supply
curvefor owner—occupied housing services over the relevant range, the implicit
subsidy reduces their priceto a fraction (1td) of supply price,
where T is the individual's marginalincome tax rate. It is expected that
lowering the effective price ofowner—occupied housing services increasesthe
demand for housing services by thosewho would own anyway, and also induces some
renters to become homeowners. These
distortions of choice lead to the excess
burden which, we now seek to estimate.
As the discussion in Section III iridicatesestimates of the following
magnitudes are required to computethe excess burden Call stated in
hold termsl;
1. p1/p1 ,thepercentage deyiatiofl in the priceo housing services
induced by the implicitsubsidy.
We.OllOW Laidler in taking d ,theproportiOn of housing expenditures
24
-
notuh ect t tax, as 0.68 ,Puttingthis together with a marginal tax rate
isbasedon the following assumptions; rateof zeturn on capital in
housing =6%of buse value, state aria local taxes =1.5%,dereciatiOrl =2.25%,
and jnaintenanCe costs =1,25%,— 39—
of0.25 yields an effective price ofhousing services of Cl —.(.25)(.68))0.83
so hp/p(1 -0.83)/i=0.17.
2. X1p1 ,expenditureson owner—occupied housing services.Suppose the
housing unit is worth$50,000, approximatelytheredian valne for the U.S. in
1978.Then given the assumptions in footnote24,the expenditure flow is
x1p1 =$50,000(o.06 +.015+.0225+.0125)=$5500per year.Inorder to
convert this figure to per householdterms,itmust be multiplied by ir,the
value of which is given below.
3.f' ,theelasticity of theprobabilityof owning with respect to
income; c ,theordina.ry (unconditional) price elasticity of demandforowner-
occupied housing; and r ,the(unconditional) income elasticity of demand.
These parameters are computed using resultsreported in Rosen's [forth-
cor'ting]study of the impact upon housing decisions of thepersonal income tax.
The econometric method upon which the resultsarebasedis a two—stage technique
discussedby Hec)cnan (1977]. In the first stage, aprobitequation for the
tenure choice decision is estimated by maximumlikelihood. From the probit
equation, itis possible to calculate 'byevaluating the probit index at
themean values for price and income, and findingtheassociated probability
25 of owning. The exercise is then repeated with an incomevalue one percent
higher.The implied valne of 'Vis 0.485. Similarly, the price elasticity
of the probability of homeownership is foundtobe -0.469.
The second stae of the econometric procedure involvesestimating the
demandforhousing, conditionalupon owning. Inorder to correct for potential
selectivity bias in the estiz'ats, a ve.r table basedupo:'t the Mills ratio is added
to the set of regressors.(See Hecicuan11977]for details.) Using a specification
25Thecomputation assumes that the head of household is a white male
between 26 and 40 years old, and has one child underthe age of 17.— 40—
whichis second order in the logarithmsofprice and income, it is found that,
evaluated at the means, the conditional incomeandprice elasticities are 0.76
and —0.97, respectively.
Recall, however, that eandr are unconditional elasticities. It is
straightforwardto show thata'-.unconditinnal elasticity is just the sum of the
associated conditional elasticity aridprobabilityelasticity. Thus,£ =-1.44
andr =1.25
4.ii,theprobability of hcxneownership.
The proportion of homeowners in the U.S. is about 0.64.
5. 0 ,thebudget share of owner-.occupied housing.
As Aaron[1972)shows, the prrçortion of housing in thebudgets of owner-
occupiers varies considerably across income groups,but a value of about 0.25
reflectsthe central tendency reasonably well. To find 0 ,theoverall budget
share for owner-occupied housing, we multiply 0.25 by the proportionof home-
owners, to find 0 =0.16[=(.25)(.64))
With these figures in h.nd, we compute in Table B.1 thenumerical counter-
parts to the fomulae in Table 3.1. The excessburden (in dollars per house-
hold per year) for any set of assumptions is found bymultiplying the appropri-
ate number in the table by $51C =.5X 5500 X 0.64 x (0.17)2)
TABLE B.l
,—
Continuous Discrete—
partial
General
1.64
1.24
1.71
131— 41—
Thetableindicates that the "discrete"computations do not differ
greatly fromtheir "continuous" ana1og.ies. (Forthe partial equilibrium case
the difference is 4.2%, for the general equilibrium case it is 5.7%.) This
closeness is due to the fact that both w,theprobability of owning, and
the income elasticity of the choice probability, are relatively high for
owner—occupied housing. In situations where these parameters are closer to
zero, the differences will tend to be more substantial; on the other hand,
in situations in which the budget share eislower than that for housing,
thedifferences will tend to besmaller. In this context it shouldbe noted
thatfigures in the "continuous" column already are"corrected"for incane
effects. This correction (which is often ignored, but which is relatively
large in this case due to the size of the budget share) amounts to a 14%
difference in the magnitude of the estimated excess burden.— 42—
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